# 1nc

## Off

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#### A. Interpretation – Introduction of US armed forces means human troops – not weapons

Lorber 13 (Eric, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science, "COMMENT: Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?," 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961, lexis)

As discussed above, critical to the application of the War Powers Resolution - especially in the context of an offensive cyber operation - are the definitions of key terms, particularly "armed forces," as the relevant provisions of the Act are only triggered if the President "introduc[es armed forces] into hostilities or into situations [of] imminent ... hostilities," n172 or if such forces are introduced "into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces." n173 The requirements may also be triggered if the United States deploys armed forces "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation." n174 As is evident, the definition of "armed forces" is crucial to deciphering whether the WPR applies in a particular circumstance to provide congressional leverage over executive actions. The definition of "hostilities," which has garnered the majority of scholarly and political attention, n175 particularly in the recent Libyan conflict, n176 will be dealt with secondarily here because it only becomes important if "armed forces" exist in the situation.¶ As is evident from a textual analysis, n177 an examination of the legislative history, n178 and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, n179 [\*990] "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government." n180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization. n181 Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces." n182 By using inclusionary - as opposed to exclusionary - language, one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as non-members constituting armed forces). n183 Second, the term "member" does not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces" refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.¶ An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed forces. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central [\*991] Intelligence Agency). n184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback, n185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces" centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones, n186 suggesting that Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S. combat troops.¶ The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities.¶ This analysis suggests that, when defining the term "armed forces," Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in [\*992] harm's way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). Applied to offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the War Powers Resolution likely does not cover such activities. Worms, viruses, and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country, could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution. n192 Thus, individual operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm's way. n193 If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target such systems. n194 As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities - which is highly unlikely - such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.

#### B. Vote Neg –

#### 1. Limits – affs can already restrict specific members of the armed forces and when and where they are introduced. Including weapons systems more than doubles the amount of armed force affs – key preparation and clash

#### 2. Precision – our interpretation is in the context of war powers, is exclusive, has an intent to define, and analysis proves that it’s what Congress defines as armed forces– accurate reading of the resolution is a pre-requisite to fairness and education

### CP

#### Text ---- The United States Executive Branch should establish a declaratory policy that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against a governmental entity, proxy, or group that has not used nuclear weapons against another governmental entity or group.

#### Solves –

#### It’s virtually identical in function---the U.S. would only override a declaratory NFU in an extreme crisis---and global public opinion would rally behind the U.S.

Feiveson and Hogendoorn 3 – Harold Feiveson, senior research scientist and co-director of the Program in Science & Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, and Ernst Hogendoorn, Ph.D. Candidate at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, Summer 2003, “No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review, online: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/102feiv.pdf

In extremis, of course, a U.S. administration might find compelling reason to override a no-first-use commitment, and actually use or explicitly threaten to use nuclear weapons. Such an act would be taken only in the most dire of circumstances, and in such a situation it is hard to believe that U.S. flaunting of a prior declaratory commitment would weigh much in how the world viewed the U.S. actions.

#### The net-benefit---making NFU an action policy and completely prohibiting all scenarios for first-use costs hundreds of thousands of lives in an inevitable crisis---the CP’s declaratory NFU enables the U.S. to override its declared posture and launch damage-limitation strikes against an imminent nuclear attacker

Tertrais 9 – Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow at the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research and Contributing Editor to Survival, October-November 2009, “The Trouble with No First Use,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 5, p. 25

A no-first-use policy might also have security costs beyond deterrence. As an action policy (as opposed to merely a declaratory one1), it would prevent a government which has adopted such a principle from striking pre-emptively at an adversary who has unmistakably demonstrated its intention to imminently launch a nuclear attack. Granted, such an extreme ‘damage limitation’ strike could only be executed in absolutely extraordinary circumstances. But it is only a slight exaggeration to say that a leader ready to forfeit it through a no-first-use policy is giving up the possibility of saving hundreds of thousands of his citizens.

#### Only a declaratory NFU creates successful existential deterrence---the knowledge that a declaratory NFU could be revoked in crisis de-escalates tension and prevents conflict

Feiveson and Hogendoorn 3 – Harold Feiveson, senior research scientist and co-director of the Program in Science & Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, and Ernst Hogendoorn, Ph.D. Candidate at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, Summer 2003, “No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review, online: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/102feiv.pdf

Opponents of a strong no-first-use declaration by the United States generally rely on three arguments. The first is that the United States may need nuclear weapons to respond to chemical and biological weapon attacks by rogue countries. This argument mistakenly conflates nuclear weapons with these other weapons of mass destruction, and in fact gives too much status to these "poor man's nuclear weapons." The second argument is that a no-first-use commitment can never be verified. While it is true that such a commitment is inherently uncertain, this uncertainty supports a no-first-use commitment, in that the country undertaking such a commitment will plan not to use nuclear weapons first, but other countries will never be quite sure that their potential adversary will never use nuclear weapons—and so nuclear use remains an existential deterrent regardless of declaratory policy. A third argument—that even if the United States would never actually use nuclear weapons, it is worthwhile to keep potential adversaries uncertain—is similarly flawed. Potential adversaries will always be uncertain. More important is to remove uncertainty from U.S. military commanders, who must never go into battle thinking they can rely on the use of nuclear weapons.

### DA 1

#### No First Use kills deterrence

Chilcoat 99 (Richard, President – National Defense University, “Strategic Forces and Deterrence: New Realities, New Roles?” Strategic Assuessment, National Defense University, http://se1.isn.ch:80/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISN&fileid=A28BAB6C-38EA-B58D-A4F2-10FE0E95174A&lng=en)

The United States has consistently eschewed an unequivocal policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons. Under the “Negative Security Assurance” concept, U.S. policy is not to use nuclear weapons unless (1) the state attacking the United States or its allies, or its military forces, is nuclear capable; (2) the state is not a party in good standing under the Nonproliferation Treaty; or (3) the state is engaged in a conflict where it is supported by a nuclear state. Moreover, U.S. officials on several occasions have made it a point not to exclude nuclear weapons use in retaliation for use of chemical and biological weapons against the United States, its forces, or allies. This does not mean that a nuclear response is the first line of defense against such an attack or that nuclear weapons use is inevitable, even to destroy biological and chemical facilities and stocks. However, U.S. policy seeks to make clear that no state can plan on using chemical or biological weapons against the United States without taking into account the possibility of a U.S. nuclear response. This helps to deter use in a crisis and plays a role in dissuading states from pursuing new or improved capabilities. In some cases, ambiguous declaratory policy may be perceived as a lack of U.S. commitment that could be exploited. If opponents are tolerant of cost and risk, greater clarity may be needed for deterrence. However, such declarations can be situation dependent and made privately without compromising a broader policy of calculated ambiguity and flexibility. At the same time, the overall posture of the U.S. must be able to support such a declaratory policy. This includes a defense against chemical and biological weapons. The United States must also be capable of a credible and proportional response, with nuclear weapons if necessary.

#### Nuclear Deterrence prevents CBW

Joseph 00 (Robert, Director – Center for Counterproliferation Research, senior scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy, professor – Missouri State University, and formerly Special Envoy for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Congressional Testimony – Senate Foreign Relations Nonproliferation Policy, 3-21)

Therefore, it is essential that the United States acquire the capabilities to deny an enemy the benefits of these weapons. These capabilities - including passive and active defenses as well as improved counterforce means (such as the ability to destroy deep and hardened underground targets and mobile missiles) - offer the best chance to strengthen deterrence, and provide the best hedge against deterrence failure. A further dimension of the WMD threat that undercuts deterrence is the growing ability of adversaries to deliver these weapons against the United States homeland, including against our cities. This is most visible with the North Korean long-range missile program but also includes the potential for unconventional delivery, especially of biological agents. For rogue states, acquiring the capability to strike our population centers denies us the convenience and simplicity of thinking in terms of fighting a purely theater war, and makes essential our development and deployment of new defensive capabilities. In this context, I commend the initiatives undertaken by the Senate to insure that our first responders are trained to deal with chemical and biological incidents, and for the passage of the National Missile Defense Act. I do not want to give the impression that the threat of punishment is not unimportant. Although not adequate by itself, such a threat remains essential for deterrence of both initial use and follow-on use of WMD by rogue states. Here, conventional superiority alone cannot provide for a credible deterrent. In fact, despite sustained and determined efforts by some to de-legitimize our nuclear weapons and assertions that their utility ended with the Cold War, our nuclear weapons play a unique and indispensable role in deterring the use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in regional contexts. This is in addition to the hedge our nuclear weapons provide against the strategic uncertainties associated with Russia and China - two states that continue to value and modernize their nuclear forces. From our examination of the real-world case of deterring Iraqi chemical and biological use in Desert Storm, and from our extensive experience in gaming, we have concluded that our nuclear weapons are the single most important instrument we have for deterring the use of chemical and biological weapons against us by rogue states. Conventional superiority, which in certain critical ways is perceived as vulnerable, especially if the enemy uses his WMD capabilities early in a conflict, is not enough. Our conventional and nuclear forces must work together to enhance deterrence in a very complex and dangerous environment. In conclusion, preventing proliferation -- and especially the spread of nuclear weapons -- has long been a stated goal of U.S. policy, beginning in the months immediately following the conclusion of World War 11 and continuing to the present. Every Administration, from President Truman forward, has made non-proliferation a central element of American foreign policy. This was evident in the Baruch proposals and in President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative. It was also apparent in the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty under President Johnson and in the conventions on prohibiting biological and chemical weapons negotiated Nixon and Bush respectively. Presidents Kennedy and Carter were not only eloquent but also passionate in their stated goal of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, and President Reagan held the vision of eliminating these weapons altogether.

#### Extinction

Sandberg et al 8—Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University. PhD in computation neuroscience, Stockholm—AND—Jason G. Matheny—PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins. special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh—AND—Milan M. Ćirković—senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade. Assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad. (Anders, How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?, 9 September 2008, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction)

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens **are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive**. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

### DA2

#### Congress likely to pass a CR and avoid shutdown now - Boehner's tactics are merely to placate conservatives down the road

Yglesias 9/18/13 (Matthew, business/economics correspondent @ Slate, "The Odds of a Government Shutdown Are Falling, Not Rising," http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/09/18/government\_shutdown\_odds\_falling\_not\_rising.html)

But read on to the second graf of the piece and you'll see that the odds are not rising at all. What's happening is that John Boehner is preparing to pass an appropriations bill that also defunds Obamacare that he knows perfectly well stands no chance of passing, and he's hoping that doing this will placate the right wing of the his caucus for when he surrenders.¶ Here they explain:¶ House leaders are hoping the vote on the defunding measure will placate conservatives once the Democratically controlled Senate rejects it. The House, they are betting, would then pass a stopgap spending measure unencumbered by such policy baggage and shift the argument to the debt ceiling, which must be raised by mid-October if the government is to avoid an economically debilitating default.¶ The key thing to remember here is that the House, as a discretionary decision, operates by the "Hastert Rule" in which only bills that are supported by a majority of GOP members can be brought to the floor for a vote. There is no Hastert-compliant appropriations bill that can pass the Senate. But there very likely is majority support in the House for the kind of "clean" funding bill that can also pass the Senate. All that has to happen is for John Boehner to violate the Hastert Rule. And the Hastert Rule isn't actually a rule, it's something Boehner has put aside many times. But it's also a rule he can't flagrantly ignore, lest his caucus get too grumpy and depose him. The operating theory here is that if Boehner has the whole House GOP indulge the maximalist faction by all passing a defunding bill, that creates enough room to move to later violate the Hastert Rule and pass a continuing resolution.¶ If anything is happening to the odds of a shutdown, in other words, they're falling, not rising.

#### Armed force authorizations generate inter-branch battles and massive controversy

Morrison 6 (Fred L. – Popham Haik Schnobrich/Lindquist & Vennum Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School, “Characteristics of International Administration in Crisis Areas: A View from the United States of America”, 2006, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 443, lexis)

This separation of powers between the two branches leads to conflicts between them in which the President may act, citing his command-in-chief and foreign affairs powers, and the Congress may take an opposing view, based on its financial powers and power over the declaration of war. The controversy plays out in many arenas, including authorization for the use of force and the appropriation of funds to support chosen policy directions.

#### Capital key

Dumain 9/18/13 (Emma, Roll Call, "Will House Democrats Balk at Sequester-Level CR?," http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/will-house-democrats-balk-at-sequester-level-cr/)

What would be helpful for the duration of the political battle over the CR between now and the end of the month, however, is if Obama more frequently took to the “bully pulpit” to blast Republicans and bolster Democrats, the aide said.¶ “The more the better,” he said.

#### Shutdown wrecks the economy

Wu 8/27/13 (Yi, “Government Shutdown 2013: Still a Terrible Idea,” PolicyMic, <http://www.policymic.com/articles/60837/government-shutdown-2013-still-a-terrible-idea>)

Around a third of House Republicans, many Tea Party-backed, sent a letter last week calling on Speaker John Boehner to reject any spending bills that include implementation of the Affordable Care Act, otherwise known as Obamacare. Some Senate Republicans echo their House colleagues in pondering this extreme tactic, which is nothing other than a threat of government shutdown as neither congressional Democrats nor President Obama would ever agree on a budget that abolishes the new health care law. Unleashing this threat would amount to holding a large number of of the federal government's functions, including processing Social Security checks and running the Centers for Disease Control, hostage in order to score partisan points. It would be an irresponsible move inflicting enormous damage to the U.S. economy while providing no benefit whatsoever for the country, and Boehner is rightly disinclined to pursue it. Government shutdowns are deleterious to the economy. Two years ago in February 2011, a similar government shutdown was looming due to a budget impasse, and a research firm estimated that quater's GDP growth would be reduced by 0.2 percentage points if the shutdown lasted a week. After the budget is restored from the hypothetical shutdown, growth would only be "partially recouped," and a longer shutdown would result in deeper slowdowns. Further, the uncertainties resulting from a shutdown would also discourage business. A shutdown was avoided last-minute that year, unlike in 1995 during the Clinton administration where it actually took place for four weeks and resulted in a 0.5 percentage-point dent in GDP growth. Billions of dollars were cut from the budget, but neither Boehner nor the Republicans at the time were reckless enough to demand cancellation of the entire health care reform enacted a year before.

#### Global nuclear war

Harris & Burrows 9 (Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the **harmful effects on fledgling democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for** greater **conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any **economically-induced drawdown** of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, **acquire additional weapons**, and consider pursuing their own **nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an **unintended escalation** and **broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on **preemption** rather than defense, potentially leading to **escalating crises**. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in **interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

## Case

### Threats

#### The Gallagher evidence only indicates that current separation of powers is bad – doesn’t say that congress sends a stronger signal and descriptive not predictive – means there’s no strong congress key warrant

#### And the Miller evidence only indicates that declaration must cause doctrinal change – key data is Russia’s lack of credibility on the NFU – means that it doesn’t make their reverse causal perception claim

#### NFU is too categorical to be credible – the U.S. will inevitably be questioned about the limits

Lewis 10 (Jeffrey, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative – New America Foundation, Former Executive Director – Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Ph.D. in Policy Studies – University of Maryland, “Declaratory Policy”, Arms Control Wonk, 1-4, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2583/declaratory-policy)

The Problem With No First Use

I am temperamentally inclined toward a “no first use” pledge. (I don’t think it would be a huge gain for the United States, though nor do I think it is a huge danger.) But it does suffer from one very specific problem. As it happens, I don’t think it would ever be in the interest of the United States would initiate the use of nuclear weapons. The late Michael Quinlan, for instance, once said in a meeting that “We do not foresee first use. We do not expect it. We will do everything in our power by our posture to sustain our expectation. But we cannot guarantee” that a situation will not arise that would force us to consider the first use of nuclear weapons. Sir Michael’s objection, I thought, was quite sensible. Categorical statements are too simplistic for the real world. As a result, others don’t take such pledges seriously. Reassurance must be credible. I often see, in the Chinese case, this particular drawback of a no-first use pledge. Americans and others don’t take it seriously — although I think we should. As a result, Chinese academics and officials often get trapped in silly “what if” games. Take the case of Chu Shulong, a Chinese academic who ended up in *Chinese Military Power* for what seems like a [relatively innocuous interview](http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1082/china-and-no-first-use): The Director of Tsinghua University’s Institute of Stratgeic Studies, in an interview with a reporter from Da Gong Bao expressed, China’s promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons was extremely clear and firm. As of now, their isn’t the slightest indication that China’s government will let go of this promise. ”(I) have not heard any leader on any occasion state China will change or let go of this position. Never.” [snip] At the same time Chu Shulong provided a hypothetical, except in the case of a foreign power launching a full scale war against China, using all of their advanced (precision) weaponry except nuclear weapons, and the Chinese nation were facing the danger of extermination, China may let go of this promise. But he considers the possibility not very great. As a result, Chu Shulong ended up in *Chinese Military Power* declaring, “China may renounce [no first use] at a time when the country’s fate hangs in the balance.” A very similar thing happened to Sha Zukang regarding Taiwan. This is a basic problem when statements are categorical — it is too easy for someone to use a “ticking time bomb” scenario (or Martians using non-nuclear lasers to incinerate elementary schools) that twist the speaker up in knots. The Chinese official or academic defending “no first use” has to either admit that, in a hot-blooded moment, that Chinese leaders might not be especially scrupulous about observing past statements or lamely repeat “China undertakes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use…” Neither is very appealing. I’ve had several Chinese participants tell me about a recent Track II meeting in Beijing where they explained China’s categorical no-first use pledge. The American participants, to make the classic point, rather clumsily suggested a hypothetical US conventional attack on China’s nuclear forces. The Chinese participants freaked. [Perhaps I should say, “were disturbed.”] The Americans went home satisfied that the Chinese weren’t very serious about no-first use; the Chinese left thinking they had been subjected to a very serious threat of coercion. And perhaps wondering if they should start planning for first-use scenarios. I am repeatedly asked about this interaction and was again during my last trip to Beijing. This particular Track II debacle is going to haunt the US-China nuclear dialogue for years. I happen to agree with not using nuclear weapons first, but as a declaratory policy it does suffer from the problem that Sir Michael identified.

#### Verification issues and prospects for reversal gut the credibility of NFU commitments.

**Makhijani 98** (Arjun, President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Ph.D. Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, specializing in nuclear fusion at UC-Berkeley, October, http://www.ieer.org/latest/de-alert.html)

First-strike dangers have sometimes been addressed in arms control debates by appeal to adoption of a "no-first-use" policy. In this context, we use the phrase "first-strike" to mean a nuclear attack on an adversary's nuclear arsenal with a view to destroying it. ("No-first-use" covers no-first-strike as well as all other possible first-use situations.) For instance, China has stated that it has a no-first-use policy and has called on other states to adopt the same. However, the policy consists essentially of a declaration that is not verifiable and is subject to quick reversal. There is some experience with such a reversal. The Soviet Union had a no-first-use policy, but in 1993 Russia reversed it though it had been in place for over a decade. Thus, while it is a useful confidence building measure, the durability and utility of no-first-use declarations have often been questioned.

#### Possibility of rollback crushes credibility of a NFU pledge – and rollback makes the US look more aggressive

Stanley 8 (Stanley Foundation – Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “A New Look at No First Use”, 4-4, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/NoFirstUsePDB708.pdf)

Some conference participants questioned whether there really was such uncertainty in the post-Cold War world. They argued that it was highly unlikely that “Stalin might come back” or that the United States would be faced with an overwhelming conventional threat that could only be offset with nuclear weapons. Indeed, pressed to describe specific scenarios that might require the first use of nuclear weapons, conference members initially could not think of any because the United States possesses overwhelming conventional superiority. Subsequently, they outlined a situation in which the US military, already fighting in two theaters (e.g., the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula), was faced with yet another major conflict. However, there was disagreement over the importance of this and similar scenarios, with some participants warning that an overabundance of caution—a fear of highly improbable scenarios—can lead to irrational policy. One participant countered that, were such a situation to arise, we could always revoke our NFU policy. However, that possibility immediately raised the problem of whether a NFU doctrine was credible because it could be so easily changed. Another participant noted that in a crisis situation, revocation of NFU would be seen as threatening and escalatory, much like mating warheads to missiles.

#### -- Verification issues and prospects for reversal gut the credibility of NFU commitments.

**Makhijani 98** (Arjun, President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Ph.D. Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, specializing in nuclear fusion at UC-Berkeley, October, http://www.ieer.org/latest/de-alert.html)

First-strike dangers have sometimes been addressed in arms control debates by appeal to adoption of a "no-first-use" policy. In this context, we use the phrase "first-strike" to mean a nuclear attack on an adversary's nuclear arsenal with a view to destroying it. ("No-first-use" covers no-first-strike as well as all other possible first-use situations.) For instance, China has stated that it has a no-first-use policy and has called on other states to adopt the same. However, the policy consists essentially of a declaration that is not verifiable and is subject to quick reversal. There is some experience with such a reversal. The Soviet Union had a no-first-use policy, but in 1993 Russia reversed it though it had been in place for over a decade. Thus, while it is a useful confidence building measure, the durability and utility of no-first-use declarations have often been questioned.

### China

#### The perkovich evidence indicates alt causalities – cites china worries over conventional weapons and missile defenses – means it’s not first use, it’s technology and not predictive – only hypothetical of we couldn’t object to china prolif – and the card takes out its own uniqueness - it indicates china has few weapons – means there’s an inherent barrier to the impact.

#### And more alt causalities on kulacki – quote: “U.S. participants in these talks do not appear to respect anyone, from either country, who takes a no-first-use pledge seriously.[2] which makes the link to politics and indicates officials would still derail talks and makes U.S. miscalc inevitable.

#### Colby says quote: “conventional war. . . seems unlikely and nuclear war even more” and says chinese nuclear deterrent coming now and their first use policy checks conflict which means that even if they win a claim to conventional war they’ve taken out the internal on escalation

#### Their next perkovich claim undercuts itself – says retaliation is an effective determination – probably means china makes the same calculation which prevents miscalc.

#### Chase evidence puts them in a double bind – says transparent talks not stable diplomacy are key – means that either talks now solve or U.S. officials will always be as suspicious as the kulacki evidence indicates.

#### And Ratner makes the obvious causal claim – us and china pursue cooperation because of fear of war – wouldn’t make sense for them to let fear of war end cooperation – means the advantage doesn’t give a coherent story.

#### Other types of weapons are an alt cause – 1AC evidence says us having conventional weapons is also bad.

#### China won’t and can’t renounce NFU – their evidence only cites 1 opinion

**Zhenqiang 5** [Pan, Professor of International Relations at the Institute for Strategic Studies, retired Major General of the People’s Liberation Army, Autumn, “China Insistence on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons,” <http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISN&fileid=A755A706-0DEF-9BDE-0865-85AAED920C65&lng=en>, Acc. Jul 28, 2009]

It is perhaps also appropriate here to say a few words about the overreactions of the U.S. media. Everybody is clear that Zhu’s statements are only his personal views, and the fact is that Zhu’s suggestions would have no effect on China’s policy-makers on the subject. Moreover there is no way for China to change its nuclear policy. Then why so much fuss about this small event? The answer may be that there are people in the United States who are only too willing to see the dark side of China. What they forget is that, to date, China so far has been the only acknowledged nuclear weapon state that solemnly maintains a commitment to NFU. Why do so few criticize the first-use policy of other nuclear weapon states in the Western media? In the United States, the official position, as well as views from many thinktanks, has almost taken it for granted that first-use against China will be an indispensable option in future U.S. nuclear policy. Evidence of this is in the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review in 2002. In that report, China is included among seven potential targets of a nuclear strike. Another recent example is an Arms Control Association report on the future of U.S. nuclear policy written by two of my long time American friends.They also touch on China as a potential adversary in the article, writing:

#### NFU doesn’t INCREASE diplomacy – means they don’t access crsisis link

#### Chinese NFU not credible now

Arbatov 8 (Dr. Alexei, Strategic Studies Institute, “Non-First-Use As A Way of Outlawing Nuclear Weapons” November, AD: 7-31)

China formally has given a no-first-use pledge. Since it has and improves its nuclear forces, this implies a second strike retaliatory strategy. However with respect of hypothetical US or Russian nuclear attack, due to the ineffectiveness or vulnerability of China’s command-control and early warning systems and nuclear forces per se such a strategy is hardly credible. It is unlikely that China, with its thousands of years of history of advanced strategic thinking might be oblivious to this fact. More possible is that China has a preemptive first-strike war-planning concept, recognizing its suicidal implications, and will retain it until more survivable forces and command systems are deployed. Hence China’s NFU pledge most probably is no more than a PR gesture like that of the USSR in 1982.

#### China will not risk war—economics and diplomacy

Fravel 12—Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at MIT. Taylor is a graduate of Middlebury College and Stanford University, where he received his PhD. He has been a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, a Predoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, a Fellow with the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program and a Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences(M. Taylor, “All Quiet in the South China Sea,” March 22nd, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137346/m-taylor-fravel/all-quiet-in-the-south-china-sea>)

Little noticed, however, has been China's recent adoption of a new -- and much more moderate -- approach. The primary goals of the friendlier policy are to restore China's tarnished image in East Asia and to reduce the rationale for a more active U.S. role there.

Beijing is also unlikely to be more assertive if that sustains Southeast Asian countries' desires to further deepen ties with the United States.

The first sign of China's new approach came last June, when Hanoi dispatched a special envoy to Beijing for talks about the countries' various maritime disputes. The visit paved the way for an agreement in July 2011 between China and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to finally implement a declaration of a code of conduct they had originally drafted in 2002 after a series of incidents in the South China Sea. In that declaration, they agreed to "exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes."

Since the summer, senior Chinese officials, especially top political leaders such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, have repeatedly reaffirmed the late Deng Xiaoping's guidelines for dealing with China's maritime conflicts to focus on economic cooperation while delaying the final resolution of the underlying claims. In August 2011, for example, Hu echoed Deng's approach by stating that "the countries concerned may put aside the disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas."

Authoritative Chinese-language media, too, has begun to underscore the importance of cooperation. Since August, the international department of People's Daily (under the pen name Zhong Sheng) has published several columns stressing the need to be less confrontational in the South China Sea. In January 2012, for example, Zhong Sheng discussed the importance of "pragmatic cooperation" to achieve "concrete results." Since the People's Daily is the official paper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, such articles should be interpreted as the party's attempts to explain its new policy to domestic readers, especially those working lower down in party and state bureaucracies.

In terms of actually setting aside disputes, China has made progress. In addition to the July consensus with ASEAN, in October China reached an agreement with Vietnam on "basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime issues." The accord stressed following international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, China and Vietnam have begun to implement the agreement by establishing a working group to demarcate and develop the southern portion of the Gulf of Tonkin near the disputed Paracel Islands.

China has also initiated or participated in several working-level meetings to address regional concerns about Beijing's assertiveness. Just before the East Asian Summit last November, China announced that it would establish a three billion yuan ($476 million) fund for China-ASEAN maritime cooperation on scientific research, environmental protection, freedom of navigation, search and rescue, and combating transnational crimes at sea. The following month, China convened several workshops on oceanography and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and in January it hosted a meeting with senior ASEAN officials to discuss implementing the 2002 code of conduct declaration. The breadth of proposed cooperative activities indicates that China's new approach is probably more than just a mere stalling tactic.

Beyond China's new efforts to demonstrate that it is ready to pursue a more cooperative approach, the country has also halted many of the more assertive behaviors that had attracted attention between 2009 and 2011. For example, patrol ships from the Bureau of Fisheries Administration have rarely detained and held any Vietnamese fishermen since 2010. (Between 2005 and 2010, China detained 63 fishing boats and their crews, many of which were not released until a hefty fine was paid.) And Vietnamese and Philippine vessels have been able to conduct hydrocarbon exploration without interference from China. (Just last May, Chinese patrol ships cut the towed sonar cable of a Vietnamese ship to prevent it from completing a seismic survey.) More generally, China has not obstructed any recent exploration-related activities, such as Exxon's drilling in October of an exploratory well in waters claimed by both Vietnam and China. Given that China retains the capability to interfere with such activities, its failure to do so suggests a conscious choice to be a friendlier neighbor.

The question, of course, is why did the Chinese shift to a more moderate approach? More than anything, Beijing has come to realize that its assertiveness was harming its broader foreign policy interests. One principle of China's current grand strategy is to maintain good ties with great powers, its immediate neighbors, and the developing world. Through its actions in the South China Sea, China had undermined this principle and tarnished the cordial image in Southeast Asia that it had worked to cultivate in the preceding decade. It had created a shared interest among countries there in countering China -- and an incentive for them to seek support from Washington. In so doing, China's actions provided a strong rationale for greater U.S. involvement in the region and inserted the South China Sea disputes into the U.S.-Chinese relationship.

By last summer, China had simply recognized that it had overreached. Now, Beijing wants to project a more benign image in the region to prevent the formation of a group of Asian states allied against China, reduce Southeast Asian states' desire to further improve ties with the United States, and weaken the rationale for a greater U.S. role in these disputes and in the region.

So far, Beijing's new approach seems to be working, especially with Vietnam. China and Vietnam have deepened their political relationship through frequent high-level exchanges. Visits by the Vietnamese Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, to Beijing in October 2011 and by the Chinese heir apparent, Xi Jinping, to Hanoi in December 2011 were designed to soothe spirits and protect the broader bilateral relationship from the unresolved disputes over territory in the South China Sea. In October, the two also agreed to a five-year plan to increase their bilateral trade to $60 billion by 2015. And just last month, foreign ministers from both countries agreed to set up working groups on functional issues such as maritime search and rescue and establish a hotline between the two foreign ministries, in addition to starting talks over the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin.

Even if it is smooth sailing now, there could be choppy waters ahead. Months of poor weather have held back fishermen and oil companies throughout the South China Sea. But when fishing and hydrocarbon exploration activities resume in the spring, incidents could increase. In addition, China's new approach has raised expectations that it must now meet -- for example, by negotiating a binding code of conduct to replace the 2002 declaration and continuing to refrain from unilateral actions.

Nevertheless, because the new approach reflects a strategic logic, it might endure, signaling a more significant Chinese foreign policy shift. As the 18th Party Congress draws near, Chinese leaders want a stable external environment, lest an international crisis upset the arrangements for this year's leadership turnover. And even after new party heads are selected, they will likely try to avoid international crises while consolidating their power and focusing on China's domestic challenges.

China's more moderate approach in the South China Sea provides further evidence that China will seek to avoid the type of confrontational policies that it had adopted toward the United States in 2010. When coupled with Xi's visit to Washington last month, it also suggests that the United States need not fear Beijing's reaction to its strategic pivot to Asia, which entails enhancing U.S. security relationships throughout the region. Instead, China is more likely to rely on conventional diplomatic and economic tools of statecraft than attempt a direct military response. Beijing is also unlikely to be more assertive if that sustains Southeast Asian countries' desires to further deepen ties with the United States. Whether the new approach sticks in the long run, it at least demonstrates that China, when it wants to, can recalibrate its foreign policy. That is good news for stability in the region.

#### US-Sino relations high – North Korea

Schell 3-7 [Orville: Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York. He is a former professor and Dean at the University of California, Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journalism, Can the North Korea Challenge Bring China and the U.S. Together? http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/can-the-north-korea-challenge-bring-china-and-the-us-together/273777/]

What may end up being most significant about the new draft resolution in the UN Security Council to impose stricter sanctions on North Korea, which China seems willing to sign, may not be what it amounts to in terms of denuclearizing the DPRK, but what it portends for U.S.-China relations. Although it is still too early to be certain, this may represent a bold new step forward by Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and China's new leadership in signaling the U.S. that China is now interested in finding new areas of convergence. To date, China has been rather reluctant to support multilateral action toward so-called rogue regimes: China opposed NATO's military campaign in Libya and, last July, China and Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution, that would have threatened sanctions against Syria's leadership.¶ But now not only have China's leaders agreed to strict new sanctions on a foreign power, but on a country that is both a neighbor and a traditional ally.¶ This is a particularly tantalizing moment because it comes just as the new leaders in Beijing are beginning to define their new foreign policy perspective while at the same time Barrack Obama is reorganizing his team for his second term. It may well represent the most significant gesture China has made toward Washington in recent years of wanting to reset the bilateral relationship.¶ When he visited Washington last year, Xi called for a "new type of great power relationship." And at the 18th Party Congress last November, Xi's predecessor Hu Jintao's report to the Party spoke of a "new type of relations among major powers" characterized by "mutual respect, mutual benefits and a win-win partnership."

### Prolif

#### And the perkovich evidence from the prolif advantage is a neg card – says Obama should construct a more limited but defensible framework to do arms deals – otherwise he’d fight the plan – that’ll be developed in the 2nc

#### Bansak indicates that other countries pursue nuclear deterrence because the us reprises them for having wmds – means they’re afraid of Syria not nukes - that’s another alt causality to a prolif deal

#### And collina indicates that the only way to reduce iran and north Korean arms is to decrease ours and russias weapons – not happening now means no possibility of solvency

#### No –uniqueness – bromley talks about npt collapse – no evidence it’s coming now and it’s from 2002

#### Utgoff concedes that prolif has a deterrent effect – and doesn’t have an internal link to increased proliferation

#### And guzansky indicates that Saudi and iran prolif would pressure israel but says at the bottom that israel could live with mutual deterrence – means takes out the major internal to middle east nuclear war

#### No widespread prolif

Hymans 12—Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [April 16, 2012, “North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show]

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. Such warnings have routinely proved wrong -- for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq -- but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground -- and their failure rate is much higher -- than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.

As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. These problems are debilitating, and they cannot be fixed simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

#### No First Use pledge doesn’t resolve the motivations of proliferating states.

**WSJ 07** (Wall Street Journal, 11/19, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/11/26\_brown\_article\_responses.php)

Whatever their other merits (and they are significant), it is difficult to argue that a comprehensive test ban treaty, a "no first use" declaration by the U.S., a dramatic reduction in the number of deployed or total nuclear weapons in our stockpile, an end to the production of fissionable material will convince North Korea, Iran, India, Pakistan or Israel to give up their nuclear weapons programs. True enough, the U.S. ratified the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty, whose Article Six states: "Each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." No one suggests abandoning the hope embodied in such a well-intentioned statement. However, hope is not a policy, and, at present, there is no realistic path to a world free of nuclear weapons. One cannot, for example, make the scientific knowledge and technological know-how that make nuclear weapons possible disappear. Proliferating states, even if they abandoned these devices under resolute international pressure, would still be able to clandestinely retain a few of their existing weapons -- or maintain a standby, break-out capability to acquire a few weapons quickly, if needed. So long as serious political differences exist between nations and peoples, and given that the possibility of nuclear weapons exists, the U.S. should have nuclear weapons to deter potential opponents and to avoid intimidation by other states seeking a capability of weapons of mass destruction. In any case, even in the absence of overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons, the great predominance of U.S. conventional forces would remain a strong motive for aspiring states to seek nuclear weapons.

#### They can’t solve non-state actors and rogue nations – can’t monitor them.

#### Prolif is super slow—empirics disprove their fear mongering.

Hymans 12—Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [May/June 2012, “Botching the Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137403/jacques-e-c-hymans/botching-the-bomb?page=show]

The chronic problem of nuclear proliferation is once again dominating the news. A fierce debate has developed over how to respond to the threat posed by Iran's nuclear activities, which most experts believe are aimed at producing a nuclear weapon or at least the capacity to assemble one. In this debate, one side is pushing for a near-term military attack to damage or destroy Iran's nuclear program, and the other side is hoping that strict sanctions against the Islamic Republic will soften it up for a diplomatic solution. Both sides, however, share the underlying assumption that unless outside powers intervene in a dramatic fashion, it is inevitable that Iran will achieve its supposed nuclear goals very soon.

Yet there is another possibility. The Iranians had to work for 25 years just to start accumulating uranium enriched to 20 percent, which is not even weapons grade. The slow pace of Iranian nuclear progress to date strongly suggests that Iran could still need a very long time to actually build a bomb -- or could even ultimately fail to do so. Indeed, global trends in proliferation suggest that either of those outcomes might be more likely than Iranian success in the near future. Despite regular warnings that proliferation is spinning out of control, the fact is that since the 1970s, there has been a persistent slowdown in the pace of technical progress on nuclear weapons projects and an equally dramatic decline in their ultimate success rate.

The great proliferation slowdown can be attributed in part to U.S. and international nonproliferation efforts. But it is mostly the result of the dysfunctional management tendencies of the states that have sought the bomb in recent decades. Weak institutions in those states have permitted political leaders to unintentionally undermine the performance of their nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians. The harder politicians have pushed to achieve their nuclear ambitions, the less productive their nuclear programs have become. Meanwhile, military attacks by foreign powers have tended to unite politicians and scientists in a common cause to build the bomb. Therefore, taking radical steps to rein in Iran would be not only risky but also potentially counterproductive, and much less likely to succeed than the simplest policy of all: getting out of the way and allowing the Iranian nuclear program's worst enemies -- Iran's political leaders -- to hinder the country's nuclear progress all by themselves.

NUCLEAR DOGS THAT HAVE NOT BARKED

"Today, almost any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years," a former chief of Israeli military intelligence recently wrote in The New York Times, echoing a widely held belief. Indeed, the more nuclear technology and know-how have diffused around the world, the more the timeline for building a bomb should have shrunk. But in fact, rather than speeding up over the past four decades, proliferation has gone into slow motion.

Seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects before 1970, and all seven succeeded in relatively short order. By contrast, of the ten countries that have launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects since 1970, only three have achieved a bomb. And only one of the six states that failed -- Iraq -- had made much progress toward its ultimate goal by the time it gave up trying. (The jury is still out on Iran's program.) What is more, even the successful projects of recent decades have needed a long time to achieve their ends. The average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched before 1970 was about seven years; the average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched after 1970 has been about 17 years.

#### Iran is driven by other things – not US nuclear policy

#### Conventional superiority will drive proliferation – even with NFU

Stanley 8 (Stanley Foundation – Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “A New Look at No First Use”, 4-4, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/NoFirstUsePDB708.pdf)

That said, conference participants were divided as to how, and how much, a NFU doctrine would affect nuclear-weapons-use norms and the nuclear weapons calculus of other states. The link between US declaratory policy and the strategic decisions of other nations is not always so clear. Iran, North Korea, and other countries have often protested US nuclear policy, citing these “nuclear threats” as a justification for their own arms programs. But conference participants generally agreed that Iran’s nuclear program is more likely a response to current US conventional superiority, and before now to Iraq’s nuclear program in the Saddam Hussein years. Indeed, the North Korean, Indian, and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs all accelerated during the 1990s, when the United States was moving to delegitimize nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, adopting NFU would at the very least deprive other states of one argument for their arsenals.

#### CTBT is key to NPT credibility – much larger than NFU

Stanley 8 (Stanley Foundation – Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “A New Look at No First Use”, 4-4, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/NoFirstUsePDB708.pdf)

In addition, participants were overwhelmingly of the opinion that the most important items to address while setting the stage for the 2010 NPT Review Conference are ratification of the CTBT and steps toward the denuclearization of North Korea and Iran. NFU factors into that calculus, but it is definitely lower on the list.

#### US nuclear policy doesn’t affect proliferation – other countries are motivated by US conventional superiority.

**Brown 07** (Harold, CSIS counselor and trustee, served as secretary of defense from 1977-81, The Washington Quarterly 31.1, Muse)

Although a world free of nuclear weapons is not a foreseeable prospect, impeding proliferation is an important consideration in U.S. national security policy. Yet, to the extent that fear of the United States motivates proliferation, the real drive for nuclear weapons capability in Iran and North Korea, as it was in Libya, does not come from fear of U.S. nuclear capability or the content of U.S. nuclear policy. It will not be eased by reductions in or the downplaying of U.S. nuclear capability, justified as such actions are. Rather, it comes from U.S. conventional power-projection capability and the concern that it may be used to intimidate, attack, or overthrow regimes, as it has done before. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the sole superpower. Inevitably, that state of affairs has led others to balance against the United States. U.S. behavior since 2000 has enhanced that tendency, and the United States has seen much of its nonmilitary dominance eroded. Yet, because the United States remains the sole military superpower, that power projection capability is not going away, however much the appetite for using it may have been reduced by the events of the last four years and by the appreciation that asymmetrical warfare may be available to the side inferior in conventional arms. In the post–World War II world, deployment of nuclear arms and the threat of their first use have been the approach of the actual or potential combatant that considered itself inferior in conventional military capability in a given theater of war. That is why the United States deployed nuclear arms in Europe in the 1950s against a Soviet force seen as greatly superior to those of NATO in conventional capability. Eisenhower had threatened to use nuclear weapons to end a politically unacceptable stalemate of attrition in Korea against numerically superior Chinese forces. It is notable that Russia and China, in a state of mutual nuclear deterrence with the United States, now talk of potential first use of tactical nuclear weapons against a superior conventional [End Page 20] military power—the United States—just as the United States used to do in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s against the Soviet Union. As to new or aspiring cases, North Korea and Iran are not going to be nuclear peers of the United States. The North Koreans do not even aspire to dominate Northeast Asia, although the Iranians' aspirations for the Middle East are an element in their nuclear goals. Both want to deter U.S. conventional military action against them. In these cases (or in that of Egypt or Saudi Arabia or Turkey, which might follow them down the proliferation trail), however, their security situation principally drives or will drive their nuclear policies. If they are to renounce or not seek nuclear weapons, they would have to decide that they are more secure without them, in some combination of an existential (survival of the state) and a strategic (survival of the regime) sense.

#### States won’t stop pursuing nuclear weapons if the US restricts its nuclear abilities.

**Chyba & Crouch 09** (Christopher F., professor of astrophysics and international affairs at Princeton University, directs the Program on Science and Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School, former National Security Council staff member in the Clinton administration, & J. D., executive vice president at Qinetiq North America, former deputy national security advisor in the W. Bush administration, The Washington Quarterly 32:3, July, http://www.twq.com/09july/docs/09jul\_ChybaCrouch.pdf)

There appears to be less divergence on whether nuclear restraint on the part of the United States will directly affect states with nuclear weapons ambitions. Most analysts believe it will not. These states have their own domestic or regional motivations or security concerns that may be driving their nuclear ambitions, even if those concerns include U.S. conventional capabilities. Differences are greatest on whether or not restraint in U.S. nuclear weapons policy influences, and how best to influence, the other groups while avoiding misperceptions about ongoing U.S. commitment to extended deterrence on behalf of allies.

#### Prolif is slow and stable—their ev is hysteria.

Mueller 9—John Mueller is a professor of political science and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center at Ohio State University [October 23, 2009, “The Rise of Nuclear Alarmism,” *Foreign Policy*, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/23/the\_rise\_of\_nuclear\_alarmism?page=full]

We have also endured decades of hysteria over the potential for nuclear proliferation, even though the proliferation that has actually taken place has been both modest and substantially inconsequential. When the quintessential rogue state, communist China, obtained them in 1964, CIA Director John McCone sternly proclaimed that nuclear war was "almost inevitable." But far from engaging in the "nuclear blackmail" expected at the time by almost everyone (except Johnson, then working at the State Department), China built its weapons quietly and has never made a nuclear threat.

Still, the proliferation fixation continues to flourish. For more than a decade, U.S. policy obsessed over the possibility that Saddam Hussein's pathetic and technologically dysfunctional regime in Iraq could in time obtain nuclear weapons (it took the more advanced Pakistan 28 years), which it might then suicidally lob, or threaten to lob, at somebody. To prevent this imagined and highly unlikely calamity, a war has been waged that has probably resulted in more deaths than were suffered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.

Today, alarm is focused on the even more pathetic regime in North Korea, which has now tested devices that if detonated in the middle of New York's Central Park would be unable to destroy buildings on its periphery. There is even more hysteria about Iran, which has repeatedly insisted that it has no intention of developing the weapons. If that regime changes its mind or is lying, it is likely to find that, except for stoking the national ego for a while, the bombs are substantially valueless, a very considerable waste of money and effort, and "absolute" primarily in their irrelevance.

As for the rest of the world, the nuclear age is clearly on the wane. Although it may not be entirely fair to characterize disarmament as an effort to cure a fever by destroying the thermometer, the analogy is instructive when it is reversed: When a fever subsides, the instrument designed to measure it loses its usefulness and is often soon misplaced. Thus far the former contestants in the Cold War have reduced their nuclear warheads by more than 50,000 to around 18,000. Other countries, like France, have also substantially cut their nuclear arsenals, while China and others have maintained them in far lower numbers than expected.

Total nuclear disarmament hardly seems to be in the offing -- nuclear metaphysicians still have their skill sets in order. But a continued decline seems likely, and experience suggests that formal disarmament agreements are scarcely necessary in all this -- though they may help the signatories obtain Nobel Peace Prizes. With the demise of fears of another major war, many of the fantastically impressive, if useless, arms that struck such deep anxiety into so many for so long are quietly being allowed to rust in peace.

#### Alt Cause – CTBT

Stanley 8 (Stanley Foundation – Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “A New Look at No First Use”, 4-4, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/NoFirstUsePDB708.pdf)

Participants were universally concerned that we do not have enough empirical data about how proliferators and potential nuclear weapon states make decisions, meaning that we cannot be sure how much a NFU doctrine (and similar measures) would affect the global nonproliferation regime. Nevertheless, some warned against an excessive focus on tabulating the costs and benefits of NFU in hypothetical situations and allowing that analysis to slow progress toward reducing the salience of nuclear weapons. These participants insisted that developing momentum was essential and that NFU could help create a culture of nonuse that smoothes the way toward eventual disarmament—a goal for which there is increasing support, as demonstrated in the January 2007 *Wall Street Journal* op-ed by George Shultz and others. At the same time, participants agreed that in trying to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons, NFU was not as important as certain other steps, notably US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

# 2nc

#### Our interpretation is that armed forces must be human troops – not weapons or capabilities – that’s best

#### Limits – Affs can restrict specific members of the armed forces by military group, restrict based on geography, and when they can be deployed. Including weapons systems massively explodes the topic. Affs can pick a specific weapon of the week and restrict its use in at least 5 different ways for different weapons – and read distinct advantages for each aff. Only limiting it to human forces provides a way to limit the number of armed force affs – should be particularly important given it’s only one of four core areas- everyone says being neg is super hard this year- they shouldn’t get to make it bigger.

Now is a key time to vote them down- first tournament of the year means they shouldn’t get away with untopical affs

#### Limits outweigh – they’re the vital access point for any theory impact – its key to fairness – huge research burdens mean we can’t prepare to compete – and its key to education – big topics cause hyper-generics, lack of clash, and shallow debate – and it destroys participation

Rowland 84 (Robert C., Debate Coach – Baylor University, “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective, Ed. Parson, p. 53-54)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that entire programs either cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

### T – Only Human – A2: We Meet

#### Even if the plan includes human involvement – it’s extra-T at best – they include restriction of weapons – that’s not armed forces and allows them to read advantages to that – has to be a voting issue – destroys neg ground by avoiding the topic and generating innovative advantages we can’t predict, and it’s outside your jurisdiction – the aff only gets to defend resolutional action

#### US Armed Forces means active duty military personnel – prefer it – congressional definition

US Congress 80 ("U.S. Policy in the Far East," US Congress - House Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 98)

(a) "United States armed forces" means the personnel on active duty belonging to the land, sea or air armed services of the United States of America when in the territory of Japan.

#### Uniformed services means people – this is true in times of war

USERRA 94 ("Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act," http://www.justice.gov/crt/military/statute.htm)

(16) The term 'uniformed services' means the Armed Forces, the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard when engaged in active duty for training, inactive duty training, or full-time National Guard duty, the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service, and any other category of persons designated by the President in time of war or national emergency.

### T – Only Human – A2: Counter-interpretation

#### --Doesn’t solve limits – that was in the overview

#### Doesn’t solve precision – our interpretation is exclusive, has an intent to define, is how congress interprets the phrase US Armed Forces, and is in the context of war powers – that’s Lorber.

#### Precision outweighs – accurate reading of the resolution is a pre-requisite to fairness and education – contrived interpretations make the resolution meaningless which makes limits and ground impossible. Plus the aff would always lose because the neg could always have a more limiting interpretation, even if it’s not based in the resolution or evidence

#### More evidence –

#### United States Armed Forces means uniformed military personnel

Internal Revenue Service 5 ("Part 7. Rulings and Agreements - Chapter 25. Exempt Organizations Determinations Manual - Section 19. Veterans' Organizations," http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm\_07-025-019.html)

Veterans are defined as present or former members of the United States Armed Forces. IRC 7701(a)(15) defines the "military or naval forces of the United States" and the term "Armed Forces of the United States" as including all regular and reserve components of the uniformed services which are subject to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force. Each term also includes the Coast Guard and the National Guard.

\*IRC = Internal Revenue Code

#### Uniformed services means people

Wikipedia 10 ("uniformed services," http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/729988)

Uniformed services are bodies of people in the employ of a state that are not employed on standard terms of contract, but have some element of additional discipline, and wear a uniform.\

#### Err neg – there’s a ton of affs within each category and few disads – topic explosion causes over-reliance on hyper-generics that consistently lose to aff-specific process advantages, signal advantages and answers. Plus, they get the first and last speech, persuasive value of the 2AR compensates for the neg block, and most of lit advocates decreasing war powers

#### United States Armed Forces means active duty

Astorino 12 (Robert P., Westchester County Executive, 11/5, "Veterans," http://humanresources.westchestergov.com/veterans)

In accordance with New York State Law, veterans of the armed forces, as defined by New York State, are entitled to additional points to be added to a passing score. Veterans derive their rights from various federal and New York State mandates, including municipal civil service rules. A veteran may be a current or former employee, a candidate, a potential candidate or any combination of the above. Consequently, not all "veterans" are entitled to the same rights or benefits.¶ The term "veteran," as defined by the New York State Civil Service Commission, is a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence who served in the armed forces of the United States during a designated time of war, and was honorably discharged or released under honorable circumstances. Also, for examination credit, a candidate must be a New York State resident at time of application. (See "Requirements for Special Rights for Veterans" chart below). "Armed forces," as used in this section, is defined as the army, navy, marine corps, air force, coast guard and the National Guard, when in service for the United States on a full-time active duty basis, other than active duty for training purposes.

#### That only means personnel

Biscoe 13 (Mike, Contributor @ eHow, "What Does Active Duty Mean in the Army?" http://www.ehow.com/about\_5047227\_active-duty-mean-army.html)

In the United States, active duty refers to all personnel serving in a full-time capacity in the U.S. Army. In other words, the army is their full-time job. This refers to both officers and enlisted personnel. The same is true of other branches of the military---the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and the Air Force. Outside the United States, the definition of active duty is not always the same.

### T – Only Human – A2: Reasonability

#### --They aren’t reasonable – the Aff literally explodes the topic and eviscerates ground – they lose under their own standard

#### -- Prefer competing interpretations –

#### A) Only objective standard – reasonability is arbitrary and takes the debate out of the hands of the debaters by encouraging overtly subjective decisions.

#### B) Incentivizes bad debate – Negs would read their worst strategy to prove abuse – don’t punish well-prepared teams.

#### -- Competing interpretations should be judged by both precision and limits – means debate mirrors relevant topic literature with respect to particular resolutional wording – solves race to the bottom

#### It’s arbitrary and undermines research

Resnick 1 Evan- assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

### CP

#### I’ll quote you a piece of their Perkivich evidence

occasional inescapability of war and the imperative of waging it justly. So, too, Obama now could examine how the ongoing existence of nuclear arsenals, even if temporary, can be reconciled with the moral-strategic imperative to prevent their use. The president could articulate a limited framework for the legitimate use of nuclear weapons that the United States believes would be defensible for others to follow as long as nuclear weapons remain. Such a nuclear policy could then be conveyed in the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Posture Review, which is due in 2014. Debate on the relative merits of the current U.S. policy and possible alternatives may encourage movement in this direction.

#### CP solves 100% of case – it implements the same changes to the President’s war powers as the plan’s statutory limitation but does so through an executive order – those orders have the same effect as the plan – that’s Duncan

#### Be skeptical of every solvency deficit – None of their evidence assumes the counterplan – it all assumes when the President doesn’t constrain their use of war powers – the CP has the President do that so congressional actions are unnecessary

#### Only the CP solves – the President will refuse the plan’s limitation

Prakash 8 (Saikrishna – Herzog Research Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law, “The Executive's Duty To Disregard Unconstitutional Laws”, 2008, Georgetown Law Journal, 96 Geo. L.J. 1613, lexis)

Perhaps most ominously, Presidents might decline to abide by statutes that are meant to constrain presidential authority. Citing a duty to disregard unconstitutional statutes, a President might elude all manner of constraints that Congress imposed upon presidential power. n28 Indeed, such complaints have been made against President George W. Bush. n29 When Congress has tried to tie his hands, the President has declared an unwillingness to abide by such statutory limitations on the grounds that they are unconstitutional.

#### Extend-

#### It’s virtually identical in function---the U.S. would only override a declaratory NFU in an extreme crisis---and global public opinion would rally behind the U.S.

Feiveson and Hogendoorn 3 – Harold Feiveson, senior research scientist and co-director of the Program in Science & Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, and Ernst Hogendoorn, Ph.D. Candidate at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, Summer 2003, “No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review, online: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/102feiv.pdf

In extremis, of course, a U.S. administration might find compelling reason to override a no-first-use commitment, and actually use or explicitly threaten to use nuclear weapons. Such an act would be taken only in the most dire of circumstances, and in such a situation it is hard to believe that U.S. flaunting of a prior declaratory commitment would weigh much in how the world viewed the U.S. actions.

#### The net-benefit---making NFU an action policy and completely prohibiting all scenarios for first-use costs hundreds of thousands of lives in an inevitable crisis---the CP’s declaratory NFU enables the U.S. to override its declared posture and launch damage-limitation strikes against an imminent nuclear attacker

Tertrais 9 – Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow at the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research and Contributing Editor to Survival, October-November 2009, “The Trouble with No First Use,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 5, p. 25

A no-first-use policy might also have security costs beyond deterrence. As an action policy (as opposed to merely a declaratory one1), it would prevent a government which has adopted such a principle from striking pre-emptively at an adversary who has unmistakably demonstrated its intention to imminently launch a nuclear attack. Granted, such an extreme ‘damage limitation’ strike could only be executed in absolutely extraordinary circumstances. But it is only a slight exaggeration to say that a leader ready to forfeit it through a no-first-use policy is giving up the possibility of saving hundreds of thousands of his citizens.

#### Only a declaratory NFU creates successful existential deterrence---the knowledge that a declaratory NFU could be revoked in crisis de-escalates tension and prevents conflict

Feiveson and Hogendoorn 3 – Harold Feiveson, senior research scientist and co-director of the Program in Science & Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, and Ernst Hogendoorn, Ph.D. Candidate at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, Summer 2003, “No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review, online: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/102feiv.pdf

Opponents of a strong no-first-use declaration by the United States generally rely on three arguments. The first is that the United States may need nuclear weapons to respond to chemical and biological weapon attacks by rogue countries. This argument mistakenly conflates nuclear weapons with these other weapons of mass destruction, and in fact gives too much status to these "poor man's nuclear weapons." The second argument is that a no-first-use commitment can never be verified. While it is true that such a commitment is inherently uncertain, this uncertainty supports a no-first-use commitment, in that the country undertaking such a commitment will plan not to use nuclear weapons first, but other countries will never be quite sure that their potential adversary will never use nuclear weapons—and so nuclear use remains an existential deterrent regardless of declaratory policy. A third argument—that even if the United States would never actually use nuclear weapons, it is worthwhile to keep potential adversaries uncertain—is similarly flawed. Potential adversaries will always be uncertain. More important is to remove uncertainty from U.S. military commanders, who must never go into battle thinking they can rely on the use of nuclear weapons.

#### Perm-

#### The plan is action policy and the CP is declaratory policy. Under declaratory NFU, it’s possible the U.S. could use nuclear weapons first

Tertrais 9 – Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow at the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research and Contributing Editor to Survival, October-November 2009, “The Trouble with No First Use,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 5, p. 26-27

The nuance is important. Declaratory policies (what states claim they would do) and action policies (what states actually plan to do) may not always be identical. However, planning for first use would be legally forbidden if a US president declared a no-first-use policy. 2 Again, vocabulary matters. Preemptive use (in case of incontrovertible evidence of an imminent nuclear attack) would be an act of self defence. Preventive use (a bolt-outof- the-blue nuclear strike) would be a different matter legally, strategically and politically. To the best of my knowledge, no Western country has included it in its nuclear doctrine; contrary to what sources quoted by Sagan claim, there is no evidence that the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review included this option.

NB-

#### The CP’s the best middle ground---it refuses to tie the hands of future presidents while adopting the substance of NFU---the consequences of nuclear war mean declaratory NFU would only be overridden in catastrophic circumstances

Boese 6 – Wade Boese, Research Director of the Arms Control Association, March 25, 2006, “Preventing Nuclear Disaster,” online: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/128

Nuclear weapons possessors should be pushed to adopt no-first-use policies. At this time, China and India are the only two states that have renounced the first use of their nuclear arms.

In the absence of ending its nuclear deployments, the 26-member NATO alliance also should forswear the first use of their nuclear weapons. In its 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO declared that the possible use of nuclear weapons is "extremely remote." But even this is an overstatement given today's political and geo-strategic realities. Moscow's overwhelming superiority in conventional forces that gave rise to NATO's nuclear policy disappeared long ago and so should NATO's readiness to introduce or employ nuclear weapons in a conflict. Universal adoption of a no-first-use option should particularly appeal to the United States, which possesses the world's most advanced and powerful conventional military. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate equalizer so it is hard to imagine a situation in which the United States would open the door to the only weapon that would moot U.S. conventional superiority. For this reason, as well as others, there really is not much affinity among the uniformed U.S. military for nuclear weapons. U.S. political leaders also find it difficult to fathom scenarios in which nuclear weapons might be used first, particularly preemptively. Ambassador Linton Brooks, who heads the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration stated November 8, 2005, "While nobody will tie the hands of a president, I can't conceive of circumstances where nuclear pre-emption makes sense…The decision to use nuclear weapons is so apocalyptic that I can't imagine that any president would ever make it lightly." Although Brooks noted that the president's hands should not be tied, they should also not be tethered to nuclear weapons. The president would be liberated, not limited, by removing an option that carries such profound and immeasurable consequences. This holds true for other world leaders as well. As long as nuclear weapons exist, their role should be confined to deterring a nuclear-weapons attack by another state. Anything more is unjustified. As former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara wrote last year in Foreign Policy, "I would characterize current U.S. nuclear weapons policy as immoral, illegal, militarily unnecessary, and dreadfully dangerous."

#### Executive orders do not cost political capital

Sovacool 9 (Benjamin – Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization and Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, “Preventing National Electricity-Water Crisis Areas in the United States”, 2009, 34 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 333, lexis)

Executive Orders also save time in a second sense. The President does not have to expend scarce political capital trying to persuade Congress to adopt his or her proposal. Executive Orders thus save presidential attention for other topics. Executive Orders bypass congressional debate and opposition, along with all of the horse-trading and compromise such legislative activity entails. n292

### Threats

### Prolif

#### Conventional superiority will drive proliferation – even with NFU

Stanley 8

Iran’s nuclear program is more likely a response to current US conventional superiority, and before now to Iraq’s nuclear program in the Saddam Hussein years. Indeed, the North Korean, Indian, and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs all accelerated during the 1990s, when the United States was moving to delegitimize nuclear weapons.

#### US nuclear policy doesn’t affect proliferation – other countries are motivated by US conventional superiority.

**Brown 07** (Harold, CSIS counselor and trustee, served as secretary of defense from 1977-81, The Washington Quarterly 31.1, Muse)

Although a world free of nuclear weapons is not a foreseeable prospect, impeding proliferation is an important consideration in U.S. national security policy. Yet, to the extent that fear of the United States motivates proliferation, the real drive for nuclear weapons capability in Iran and North Korea, as it was in Libya, does not come from fear of U.S. nuclear capability or the content of U.S. nuclear policy. It will not be eased by reductions in or the downplaying of U.S. nuclear capability, justified as such actions are. Rather, it comes from U.S. conventional power-projection capability and the concern that it may be used to intimidate, attack, or overthrow regimes, as it has done before. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the sole superpower. Inevitably, that state of affairs has led others to balance against the United States. U.S. behavior since 2000 has enhanced that tendency, and the United States has seen much of its nonmilitary dominance eroded. Yet, because the United States remains the sole military superpower, that power projection capability is not going away, however much the appetite for using it may have been reduced by the events of the last four years and by the appreciation that asymmetrical warfare may be available to the side inferior in conventional arms. In the post–World War II world, deployment of nuclear arms and the threat of their first use have been the approach of the actual or potential combatant that considered itself inferior in conventional military capability in a given theater of war. That is why the United States deployed nuclear arms in Europe in the 1950s against a Soviet force seen as greatly superior to those of NATO in conventional capability. Eisenhower had threatened to use nuclear weapons to end a politically unacceptable stalemate of attrition in Korea against numerically superior Chinese forces. It is notable that Russia and China, in a state of mutual nuclear deterrence with the United States, now talk of potential first use of tactical nuclear weapons against a superior conventional [End Page 20] military power—the United States—just as the United States used to do in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s against the Soviet Union. As to new or aspiring cases, North Korea and Iran are not going to be nuclear peers of the United States. The North Koreans do not even aspire to dominate Northeast Asia, although the Iranians' aspirations for the Middle East are an element in their nuclear goals. Both want to deter U.S. conventional military action against them. In these cases (or in that of Egypt or Saudi Arabia or Turkey, which might follow them down the proliferation trail), however, their security situation principally drives or will drive their nuclear policies. If they are to renounce or not seek nuclear weapons, they would have to decide that they are more secure without them, in some combination of an existential (survival of the state) and a strategic (survival of the regime) sense.

# 1nr

### Prolif

They’ve conceded that there’s no risk of prolif – way too slow and hasn’t empirically happened – that’s both pieces of hyman evidence

#### And extend the wsj evidence indicates nfu has no effect on proliferation – incentive now

### Deterrence

#### Extend the uniqueness evidence only ambiguous policies solve deterrence – and there’s no uniqueness

#### Econ collapse undermines global public health efforts – turns disease

Fidler 8 (David P., Professor of Law, Indiana University, University Center on American and Global Security, “After the Revolution: Global Health Politics in a Time of Economic Crisis and Threatening Future Trends,” Global Health Governance, Fall 2008/Spring 2009, Volume 2, Number 2)

Further, the global economic crisis is absorbing ever larger amounts of capital to keep governments, financial institutions, and corporations afloat, which drastically reduces the availability of resources for addressing the growing costs of providing adequate public health and health care for populations around the world. Even before the global economic crisis hit, experts argued that the unprecedented increases in national spending and development assistance for health were inadequate and, even worse, that many developed donor countries had not fulfilled existing aid pledges. 56 Thus, maintaining existing levels of domestic spending and development assistance on health would not be sufficient, but increased expenditures seem unlikely for years while the global economy recovers. The more likely scenario is reductions in health spending within national budgets and in foreign aid programs. Such reductions, even if shortlived, will have a severe impact on global health activities already desperately in need of more financial resources. Perhaps the cruelest irony of the global economic crisis is its emergence in the year WHO and global health stakeholders renewed the push for achieving primary health care for all. The report of the Commission on Social Determinants of Health advocated for primary health care in 2008.57 The World Health Report 2008 focused on primary health care, 58 and the WHO Director-General connected the new emphasis on primary health care to the Declaration of AlmaAta, which first launched the “health for all” strategy based on universal primary health care in 1978.59 However, 30 years ago, the Alma-Ata strategy was derailed by developments in the energy and economic sectors that sound ominously familiar, as the WHO Director-General recognized in September 2008: Nor could the visionary thinkers in 1978 have foreseen world events: an oil crisis [that began in 1979], a global recession [in the early 1980s], and the introduction [in the 1980s], by development banks, of structural adjustment programmes that shifted national budgets away from the social services, including health. As resources for health diminished, selective approaches using packages of interventions gained favour over the intended aim of fundamentally reshaping health care. The emergence of HIV/AIDS, the associated resurgence of tuberculosis, and an increase in malaria cases moved the focus of international public health away from broad-based programmes and towards the urgent management of highmortality emergencies.60 The effort to rejuvenate the primary health care movement in a year in which global food, energy, and economic crises emerged proved ill-timed, and the worsening nightmare of the global economic crisis threatens even more damage to the political, economic, and social conditions needed to achieve progress on universal primary health care. Put another way, political, economic, and intellectual capital for advancing the primary health care agenda will, for the foreseeable future, be in short supply. Instead, as with the energy and food crises, global health finds itself scrambling to address an emergency with potentially devastating consequences for the health of individuals and populations, health services and systems, and the social determinants of health.

### Us-china

#### Multiple important concessions – extend the alt causalities – their evidence says us officials would derail because they don’t trust nfu countries and china is worried about conventional weapons and missile defense – means that the nfu wouldn’t be enough

#### Even if you give them that they can solve – nothing to solve for they’ve conceded that their own Colby evidence indicates their’s no impact there wouldn’t be conventional war and and even there is conventional war there certainly wouldn’t be nuclear escalation

#### And they’ve taken out their own scenario – china has an nfu means a miscalc can’t escalate to the terminal – that’s the conceded zhenqiang evidence from lower in the flow

#### The only argument they explicitly answer is that transparency isn’t enough, but obviously the alt causalities indicate the impossibility of diplomatic progress

#### And it doesn’t matter because china will cooperate no matter what because they’re afraid of nuclear war – that’s their ratner – reason that relations wouldn’t even break down if weren’t friendly.

#### The fravel evidence is execellent – indicates china has realized it’s oversteps – means any empirical evidence for china war is assumed by our evidence – and will use economic tools to cooperate – they can’t do that if there isn’t a global economy – means economy is the key check

#### US-Sino relations high – North Korea

Schell 3-7 [Orville: Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York. He is a former professor and Dean at the University of California, Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journalism, Can the North Korea Challenge Bring China and the U.S. Together? http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/can-the-north-korea-challenge-bring-china-and-the-us-together/273777/]

What may end up being most significant about the new draft resolution in the UN Security Council to impose stricter sanctions on North Korea, which China seems willing to sign, may not be what it amounts to in terms of denuclearizing the DPRK, but what it portends for U.S.-China relations. Although it is still too early to be certain, this may represent a bold new step forward by Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and China's new leadership in signaling the U.S. that China is now interested in finding new areas of convergence. To date, China has been rather reluctant to support multilateral action toward so-called rogue regimes: China opposed NATO's military campaign in Libya and, last July, China and Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution, that would have threatened sanctions against Syria's leadership.¶ But now not only have China's leaders agreed to strict new sanctions on a foreign power, but on a country that is both a neighbor and a traditional ally.¶ This is a particularly tantalizing moment because it comes just as the new leaders in Beijing are beginning to define their new foreign policy perspective while at the same time Barrack Obama is reorganizing his team for his second term. It may well represent the most significant gesture China has made toward Washington in recent years of wanting to reset the bilateral relationship.¶ When he visited Washington last year, Xi called for a "new type of great power relationship." And at the 18th Party Congress last November, Xi's predecessor Hu Jintao's report to the Party spoke of a "new type of relations among major powers" characterized by "mutual respect, mutual benefits and a win-win partnership."

#### Impact outweighs – econ is the biggest impact – our wu evidence specifies that economic decline would cause mass proliferation in the middle-east – that’s nuclear conflict

#### Probability -- conflict now is highly likely given other economic stressors

Mootry 9 (Primus, B.A. Northern Illinois University “Americans likely to face more difficult times” - The Herald Bulletin, http://www.theheraldbulletin.com/columns/local\_story\_282184703.html?keyword=secondarystory)

These are difficult times. The direct and indirect costs associated with the war on Iraq have nearly wrecked our economy. The recent $700 billion bailout, bank failures, and the failure of many small and large businesses across the nation will take years — perhaps decades — to surmount. Along with these rampant business failures, we have seen unemployment rates skyrocket, record numbers of home foreclosures, an explosion of uninsured Americans, and other economic woes that together have politicians now openly willing to mention the "D" word: Depression. These are difficult days. We have seen our international reputation sink to all time lows. We have seen great natural disasters such as hurricanes Ike and Katrina leaving hundreds of thousands of citizens stripped of all they own or permanently dislocated. In all my years, I have never seen a time such as this. To make matters worse, we are witnessing a resurgence of animosities between the United States and Russia, as well as the rapid growth of India and China. As to the growth of these two huge countries, the problem for us is that they are demanding more and more oil — millions of barrels more each week — and there is not much we can say or do about it. In the meantime, if America does not get the oil it needs, our entire economy will grind to a halt. In short, the challenges we face are complex and enormous. Incidentally, one of the factors that makes this time unlike any other in history is the potential for worldwide nuclear conflict. **There has never been a time in** the long **history** of man **when**, through his own technologies — and his arrogance — he can destroy the planet. Given the tensions around the world, **a mere spark could lead to global conflagration.**[This evidence has been gender paraphrased].

#### Growth prevents miscalculation and war with China

Glaser 5/2/12 (“China is Reacting to Our Weak Economy” Bonnie S. Glaser (senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.) 5/2/2012 http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/02/are-we-headed-for-a-cold-war-with-china/china-is-reacting-to-our-weak-economy)

To maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and secure American interests, the United States must sustain its leadership and bolster regional confidence in its staying power. The key to those goals is reinvigorating the U.S. economy. Historically, the Chinese have taken advantage of perceived American weakness and shifts in the global balance of power. In 1974 China seized the Paracel Islands from Saigon just after the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Treaty, which signaled the U.S. withdrawal from the region. When the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met one of Deng Xiaoping’s “three obstacles” requirements for better ties and withdrew from Can Ranh Bay, Vietnam, in 1988, China snatched seven of the Spratly Islands from Hanoi. Two decades later, as the United States-Philippines base agreement was terminated, China grabbed Mischief Reef from Manila. Beijing must not be allowed to conclude that an economic downturn means our ability to guarantee regional stability has weakened. The Chinese assertive behaviors against its neighbors in recent years in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea were in part a consequence of China’s assessment that the global financial crisis signaled the beginning of U.S. decline and a shift in the balance of power in China’s favor. The Obama administration’s “rebalancing” or “pivot” to Asia will help prevent Chinese miscalculation and increase the confidence of U.S. partners in U.S. reliability as the ballast for peace and stability in the region. But failure to follow through with actions and resources would spark uncertainty and lead smaller countries to accommodate Chinese interests in the region. Most important, the United States must revive its economy. China will inevitably overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world in the coming decade or two. The United States must not let Beijing conclude that a relative decline in U.S. power means a weakened United States unable to guarantee regional peace and stability. The Chinese see the United States as mired in financial disorder, with an alarming budget deficit, high unemployment and slow economic growth — which, they predict, will lead to America's demise as the sole global superpower. To avoid Chinese miscalculation and greater United States-China strategic competition, the United States needs to restore financial solvency and growth through bipartisan action.

#### Econ growth prevents war with China – sticky power ensures interdependence not war

Mead 04 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow at Council on Foreign Relations, “America's STICKY Power,” Foreign Policy, Mar/Apr, Proquest)

China's rise to global prominence will offer a key test case for sticky power. As China develops economically, it should gain wealth that could support a military rivaling that of the United States; China is also gaining political influence in the world. Some analysts in both China and the United States believe that the laws of history mean that Chinese power will someday clash with the reigning U.S. power. Sticky power offers a way out. China benefits from participating in the U.S. economic system and integrating itself into the global economy. Between 1970 and 2003, China's gross domestic product grew from an estimated $106 billion to more than $1.3 trillion. By 2003, an estimated $450 billion of foreign money had flowed into the Chinese economy. Moreover, China is becoming increasingly dependent on both imports and exports to keep its economy (and its military machine) going. Hostilities between the United States and China would cripple China's industry, and cut off supplies of oil and other key commodities. Sticky power works both ways, though. If China cannot afford war with the United States, the United States will have an increasingly hard time breaking off commercial relations with China. In an era of weapons of mass destruction, this mutual dependence is probably good for both sides. Sticky power did not prevent World War I, but economic interdependence runs deeper now; as a result, the "inevitable" U.S.-Chinese conflict is less likely to occur.

### U - Shutdown close

#### **Extend Yglesias - continuing resolution will be passed now by Boehner placating republicans – evidence indicates there’s just enough room – their evidence is non-predictive of republican tactics – means you err neg on uniqueness**

#### Shutdown will be avoided now - but it will be close

Lunney 9/18/13 (Kellie, Government Executive, "Votes on Keeping Government Open Could Come Down to the Wire," http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2013/09/votes-keeping-government-open-could-come-down-wire/70498/)

Steve Bell, senior director of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Economic Policy Project, said he thinks the Republican and Democratic House leadership ultimately will negotiate to avoid a government shutdown. But, “for the first time this year, I think they are going to cut it pretty close,” Bell said. The last time the government almost shut down -- with about an hour to spare -- was April 2011.

#### Obama has the leverage in the shutdown showdown

Scheiber 9/15/13 (Noam, Senior Editor @ The New Republic, "This Time There Really Will Be a Government Shutdown," http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114728/boehner-and-obama-cant-avoid-government-shutdown)

Start with the White House, which has been annoyingly open to concessions even when it has all the leverage. In my own conversations with White House officials (and people close to them) over the past few months, I’ve picked up a clear willingness to allow a shutdown if Republicans refuse to budge. This is unlike 2011, the last time the White House faced a shutdown situation. Back then, a well-connected former administration official told me recently, “the political strategists wanted a deal. [Senior adviser David] Plouffe wanted a deal . . . to increase our numbers with independents.” This time, according to this source, “There’s no constituency for caving.” ¶ That jibes with the change of heart I’ve detected when speaking directly to White House officials. In 2011, they were queasy about the risks a shutdown posed to the rickety economy, which could ultimately hurt the president. This year, they believe a shutdown would strengthen their hand politically, which is almost certainly true given the public outrage that would rain down on Republicans. One official pointed out that the pressure for spending cuts has subsided with the deficit falling so rapidly on its own. ¶

### Internals – Capital Key

#### House GOP will cave and approve the continuing resolution in the coming weeks - Obama has the necessary leverage

Terbush 9/18/13 (Jon, Staff @ The Week, "A government shutdown is a high-stakes game the GOP can't win," http://theweek.com/article/index/249809/a-government-shutdown-is-a-high-stakes-game-the-gop-cant-win)

Boehner has shown before that when push comes to shove, he's willing to negotiate, even if that means going against the wishes of his party's most conservative members. To avoid a shutdown in 2011, he agreed to an 11th hour deal with lesser spending cuts than conservatives wanted.¶ This time, Obama may have even more leverage.¶ The president on Wednesday accused the GOP of trying to "extort" him. And polls show that the public would overwhelmingly blame Republicans in the event of a shutdown — a CNN survey last week found that 51 percent of Americans would blame the GOP, while only 33 percent would blame Obama.¶ Rep. Paul Ryan (R-Wis.), the GOP's budget guru, is privately taking a stand against the defund attempt for that very reason.¶ "We have to stay on the right side of public opinion," Ryan reportedly said during a GOP conference Wednesday morning, according to National Review's Robert Costa. "Shutting down the government puts us on the wrong side."¶ The dynamic ultimately comes down to this: If Republicans want to fund the government, they will at some point have to pass a spending bill that leaves ObamaCare funding intact. Anything else will die a swift death in the Senate.¶ "This doesn't fundamentally change our plans and it just delays the day when House Republicans will have to pass (or at least help pass) a CR," an aide to Senate Democratic leadership told the Washington Post's Greg Sargent. "If they don't, they will shut down the government. It's that simple. All procedural roads in the Senate lead to a clean CR. There is no scenario in which we pass anything that defunds or delays Obamacare."¶ In other words, Boehner will have to give in at some point in the next two weeks. Triggering a politically masochistic shutdown with no upside before doing is nothing less than a crazy proposition.

#### Political capital key to Obama's economic agenda

Indiviglio 9/19/13 (Daniel, Reuters Breakingviews columnist, "Activist would contest Obama’s capital allocation," http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2013/09/19/activist-would-contest-obamas-capital-allocation/)

The economy and jobs came in second, absorbing 16 percent of Obama’s output. Arguably these areas deserve significantly more capital – perhaps 25 percent or more of the president’s effort. Growth remains modest, and unemployment is too high at 7.3 percent. If he can get the economy cranking faster, it should make other things easier to tackle – like his third most significant talking point, education.¶ Social issues like immigration and gun control garnered nearly the same 15 percent portion of Obama’s rhetorical pie as education. But spending and deficits, where potential emergencies loom, accounted for only 6 percent. Poorly constructed budget cuts threaten the tepid recovery. And Congress looks poised to make raising the federal debt limit as painful as it did two years ago. The broad economic risks make this an area demanding far more presidential attention.

### Internal – Capital Finite

#### Obama's capital is finite - needs as much as possible for budget fights

Boesler 9/18/13 (Matthew, Business Insider, "BNP Analyst Blasts All This Chatter About Don Kohn Getting The Fed Job," http://www.businessinsider.com/analyst-says-don-kohn-fed-chair-chatter-misinformed-2013-9#ixzz2fMDmQYg4)

BNP Paribas economist Julia Coronado doesn't think there's much to all the chatter about Kohn, though:¶ On the chatter about Kohn – the decision will be made based on political capital. Obama lost on Summers because his political [capital] is low, it would cost him dearly to get Summers into the seat, and he needs as much as he can get for the upcoming budget fight. He lost on Summers, the campaign was as much pro-Yellen as it was anti-Summers; why spend more capital on this fight?

#### Every bit of political capital matters over budget fights

Lills and Wasson 9/7/13 (Mike and Erik, The Hill, "Fears of wounding Obama weigh heavily on Democrats ahead of vote," http://thehill.com/homenews/house/320829-fears-of-wounding-obama-weigh-heavily-on-democrats)

Obama needs all the political capital he can muster heading into bruising battles with the GOP over fiscal spending and the debt ceiling.

### U -Saving PC

#### Summers added political capital for the fight over the continuing resolution

Carmichael 9/16/13 (Kevin, Globe and Mail, "A fractious fall looms in Washington now Summers is out of the running," http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/with-summers-out-of-running-a-fractious-fall-looms-in-washington/article14357991/)

Stocks rose around the world, as traders reasoned the transition to a new Fed chairman will be more predictable with Prof. Summers out of the race. Janet Yellen, the No. 2 at the Fed, re-emerged as the front-runner, a status she had lost to Prof. Summers in the uncommonly public contest to replace Ben Bernanke, whose four-year term ends in January.¶ “Larry was not my first choice for Federal Reserve chair,” said Elizabeth Warren, a Democratic member of the Senate banking committee who won in Massachusetts in 2012 in part because of her vocal criticism of Wall Street’s role in the financial crisis. “I’m a big fan of Janet Yellen,” Ms. Warren added in an interview with Bloomberg Television on Monday. “I think she’s terrific. She’s got the right experience and I think she’d make a terrific Federal Reserve chair.”¶ Ms. Warren was one of four Democrats on the banking committee who said they would vote against Prof. Summers. That meant the White House would have had to have sought Republican support to get Prof. Summers through the committee stage of the nomination process and onto the Senate floor. That’s more political capital than the President currently has to spend.¶ “Republicans would have wanted something in return,” Mr. Bosworth said. “It wasn’t worth it.”¶ More of the contentious fiscal showdowns that have characterized Mr. Obama’s relationship with the Republican-led House of Representatives are on the horizon.

#### And - obama spending capital on budget issues now – he’s entered the fray and is arm-twisting for support – means he has just enough

Blake 9/18/13 (Aaron, Wash Post, "Carney assures that Obama 'has twisted arms'," http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/09/18/carney-assures-that-obama-has-twisted-arms/)

White House press secretary Jay Carney on Wednesday fought back against criticism that President Obama has been disengaged from legislative battles on Capitol Hill.¶ "He has twisted arms," Carney said. "He has used the powers that are available to him to try to convince, persuade, cajole Republicans into doing the sensible thing...."¶ Pressed on Obama's role in the current budget debate and his refusal to negotiate over the debt ceiling, Carney rebuffed the idea that the president isn't involved.¶ “You’re assuming he’s above the fray," Carney said. "He’s not. He’s in the fray. And he was in the fray today, and he'll be in the fray until Congress does the right thing.”

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#### US economic collapse will destroy the global economy

Mead 04 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow at Council on Foreign Relations, “America's STICKY Power,” Foreign Policy, Mar/Apr, Proquest)

Similarly, in the last 60 years, as foreigners have acquired a greater value in the United States-government and private bonds, direct and portfolio private investments-more and more of them have acquired an interest in maintaining the strength of the U.S.-led system. A collapse of the U.S. economy and the ruin of the dollar would do more than dent the prosperity of the United States. Without their best customer, countries including China and Japan would fall into depressions. The financial strength of every country would be severely shaken should the United States collapse. Under those circumstances, debt becomes a strength, not a weakness, and other countries fear to break with the United States because they need its market and own its securities. Of course, pressed too far, a large national debt can turn from a source of strength to a crippling liability, and the United States must continue to justify other countries' faith by maintaining its long-term record of meeting its financial obligations. But, like Samson in the temple of the Philistines, a collapsing U.S. economy would inflict enormous, unacceptable damage on the rest of the world. That is sticky power with a vengeance.

### Link

#### Yes Obama fights Congress –

#### It’s normal means –

#### (If not read) Obama fights the plan

Rana 11 (Aziz – Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, “TEN QUESTIONS: RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS”, 2011, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5099, lexis)

Thus, for many legal critics of executive power, the election of Barack Obama as President appeared to herald a new approach to security concerns and even the possibility of a fundamental break from Bush-era policies. These hopes were immediately stoked by Obama's decision before taking office to close the Guantanamo Bay prison. n4 Over two years later, however, not only does Guantanamo remain open, but through a recent executive order Obama has formalized a system of indefinite detention for those held there and also has stated that new military commission trials will begin for Guantanamo detainees. n5 More important, in ways small and large, the new administration remains committed to core elements of the previous constitutional vision of national security. Just as their predecessors, Obama officials continue to defend expansive executive detention and war powers and to promote the centrality of state secrecy to national security.

#### Normal means should govern 1AC implementation: its based in literature, predictable for both sides because it’s the most likely, and it’s fair – it’s the only way to truly debate inter branch struggles over war powers - that’s key to politics and legal education on this topic

### shutdown

**Failure to compromise tanks global econ recovery efforts**

**Sherwell 11** (Philip, London Telegraph, "US shutdown looms as budget war rage," http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/recession/8335823/US-shutdown-looms-as-budget-war-rages.html)

Fears over the strength of the US economic recovery were growing last night after a highly unusual all-night session of the Republican House of Representatives agreed to slash the federal budget by $61bn by the end of September.¶ The deal, thrashed out in the early hours, was immediately condemned by US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, who said the cuts would hit the fragile economy.¶ It now appears there will be a potentially damaging stand-off between President Barack Obama and Republican leaders with a possible shut-down of the federal government if agreement cannot be reached in the next fortnight.¶ "The continuing resolution as passed by the House would undermine and damage our capacity to create jobs and expand the economy," Mr Geithner said at the G20 summit in Paris yesterday.¶ President Obama has already pledged to veto the aggressive cuts. The proposal must now be debated by the Senate, the upper chamber of Congress, where Democrats hold a slim majority. There is a growing danger the federal government will close down on March 4 if a compromise short-term spending deal cannot be struck between the White House and two houses of Congress. Such paralysis is likely to damage US economic prospects and therefore the chances of continuing global recovery.

#### Obama’s using all his political capital on the budget battle now – it’s his singular focus

Allen 9/19/13 (Jonathan, Politico, "GOP battles boost President Obama," http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=17961849-5BE5-43CA-B1BC-ED8A12A534EB)

There’s a simple reason President Barack Obama is using his bully pulpit to focus the nation’s attention on the battle over the budget: In this fight, he’s watching Republicans take swings at each other.¶ And that GOP fight is a lifeline for an administration that had been scrambling to gain control its message after battling congressional Democrats on the potential use of military force in Syria and the possible nomination of Larry Summers to run the Federal Reserve.¶ If House Republicans and Obama can’t cut even a short-term deal for a continuing resolution, the government’s authority to spend money will run out on Oct. 1. Within weeks, the nation will default on its debt if an agreement isn’t reached to raise the federal debt limit.¶ For some Republicans, those deadlines represent a leverage point that can be used to force Obama to slash his health care law. For others, they’re a zero hour at which the party will implode if it doesn’t cut a deal.¶ Meanwhile, “on the looming fiscal issues, Democrats — both liberal and conservative, executive and congressional — are virtually 100 percent united,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.).¶ Just a few days ago, all that Obama and his aides could talk about were Syria and Summers. Now, they’re bringing their party together and shining a white hot light on Republican disunity over whether to shut down the government and plunge the nation into default in a vain effort to stop Obamacare from going into effect.¶ The squabbling among Republicans has gotten so vicious that a Twitter hashtag — #GOPvsGOPugliness — has become a thick virtual data file for tracking the intraparty insults. Moderates, and even some conservatives, are slamming Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, a tea party favorite, for ramping up grassroots expectations that the GOP will shut down the government if it can’t win concessions from the president to “defund” his signature health care law.¶ “I didn’t go to Harvard or Princeton, but I can count,” Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) tweeted, subtly mocking Cruz’s Ivy League education. “The defunding box canyon is a tactic that will fail and weaken our position.”¶ While it is well-timed for the White House to interrupt a bad slide, Obama’s singular focus on the budget battle is hardly a last-minute shift. Instead, it is a return to the narrative arc that the White House was working to build before the Syria crisis intervened.¶ And it’s so important to the president’s strategy that White House officials didn’t consider postponing Monday’s rollout of the most partisan and high-stakes phase even when a shooter murdered a dozen people at Washington’s Navy Yard that morning.

#### Shutdown makes us vulnerable to a cyber-attack

Sideman 11 (Alysia, Federal Computer Week Contributor, “Agencies must determine computer security teams in face of potential federal shutdown” Federal Computer Week, http://fcw.com/Articles/2011/02/23/Agencies-must-determine-computer-security-teams-in-face-of-shutdown.aspx?Page=1)

With the WikiLeaks hacks and other threats to cybersecurity present, guarding against cyberattacks has become a significant part of governing -- especially because most government agencies have moved to online systems.¶ As a potential government shutdown comes closer, agencies must face new questions about defining “essential” computer personnel. Cyber threats weren’t as significant during the 1995 furlough as they are today, reports NextGov. The publication adds that agencies need to buck up and be organized. ¶ In late January, government officials, NATO and the European Union banded together in Brussels to formulate a plan to battle cyber bandits, according to Defense Systems.¶ Leaders there agreed that existing cybersecurity measures were incomplete and decided to fast-track a new plan for cyber incident response.¶ Meanwhile, observers are wondering whether the U.S. government has a plan to deal with cyberattacks in the case of a shutdown.¶ The lists of essential computer security personnel drawn up 15 years ago are irrelevant today, computer specialists told NextGov.¶ In 1995, the only agencies concerned about cybersecurity were entities such as the FBI and CIA. Today, before any potential government shutdown happens, a plan of essential IT personnel should be determined, the specialists add.¶ Agencies should be figuring out which systems will need daily surveillance and strategic defense, as well as evaluating the job descriptions of the people operating in those systems, former federal executives told NextGov.¶ Hord Tipton, a former Interior Department CIO, agrees. “If they haven’t done it, there’s going to be a mad scramble, and there’s going to be a hole in the system,” he told the site. ¶ All government departments are supposed to have contingency plans on deck that spell out essential systems and the employees associated with them, according to federal rules.¶ Meanwhile, some experts say determining which IT workers are essential depends more on the length of the shutdown.¶ Jeffrey Wheatman, a security and privacy analyst with the Gartner research group, tells NextGov that a shutdown lasting a couple of weeks “would require incident response personnel, network administrators and staff who monitor firewall logs for potential intrusions.”¶ If a shutdown lasted a month or longer, more employees would need to report, he said, adding: “New threats could emerge during that time frame, which demands people with strategy-oriented job functions to devise new lines of defense.”¶ Employees who are deemed “essential” are critical to national security.¶ Cyber warfare or holes in cybersecurity can threaten a nation’s infrastructure. In particular, the electric grid, the nation’s military assets, financial sector and telecommunications networks can be vulnerable in the face of an attack, reports Federal Computer Week.

### Cyber Impacts - Accidental Nuke War

#### Cyber attacks cause accidental nuclear war

Cimbala 99 (Stephen, professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University Delaware County Campus, Summer 1999, Armed Forces & Society: An Interdisciplinary Journal, p. online)

The nuclear shadow over the information age remains significant. The essence of information warfare is in subtlety and deception: the manipulation of uncertainty. The essence of nuclear deterrence lies in the credible and certain threat of retaliation backed by an information environment accepted and trusted by both sides in a partly competitive, partly conflictual relationship. Nuclear assets may themselves become the targets of cyberwarriors. Triumphalism about the RMA in high technology conventional weapons overlooks asymmetrical strategies that might appeal to U.S. opponents. Among these might be the reciprocal use of information warfare to deny U.S. access in time of need to a timely nuclear response or to a credible nuclear threat. But even more problematic is the potential collision course between intentional information warfare and unintended side effects when cyberwar is waged against a nuclear armed state, especially one with a non-Western culture. Neither the status of nuclear forces in the new world order, nor all of the military implications of the information revolution, are apparent now. There are reasons to suppose that the strategies and technologies of information warfare will develop along one track, whereas efforts to control nuclear weapons spread and to establish the safety and security of existing nuclear arsenals will involve a different community of specialists and attentive publics. Nevertheless, there are sufficient grounds to be concerned that a too successful menu of information strategies may contribute to a failure of nuclear deterrence in the form of accidental/inadvertent war or escalation. Unplanned interactions between infowarriors and deterrers could have unfortunate byproducts.

#### Global escalation and nuclear war

PR Newswire, 4-29-98 (lexis)

An 'accidental' nuclear attack would create a public health disaster of an unprecedented scale, according to more than 70 articles and speeches on the subject, cited by the authors and written by leading nuclear war experts, public health officials, international peace organizations, and legislators. Furthermore, retired General Lee Butler, Commander from 1991-1994 of all U.S. Strategic Forces under former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, has warned that from his experience in many "war games" it is plausible that such an attack could provoke a nuclear counterattack that could trigger full-scale nuclear war with billions of casualties worldwide.,